The Hangman’s Judgement

Daniel Kehlmann’s brilliant novel Tyll features a comically reluctant hangman. Killing does not suit Master Tilman’s kind nature. Yet, he does not have a choice: in 17^th-century Germany, a hangman’s son must become a hangman. It is not a desirable profession; people avoid the hangman, as everyone knows talking to him would hurts one’s honour. Even worse, perhaps, is the risk of being cursed by the convicted. Master Tilman fears his victims will not forgive him before they die, with the result that he would have to face God’s eventual judgement as a murderer.

His current victim is a suspected warlock who, after weeks of being tortured by Master Tilman, confessed to elaborate accounts of black magic. The day before the execution, the hangman tries to remove the threat of being cursed by gently reminding the condemned of what he is supposed to do.

‘Listen,’ he says softly. ‘When you’re standing under the gallows tomorrow – don’t forget that you have to forgive everyone.’ (…) ‘The judges,’ says Master Tilman. ‘And you have to forgive me too.’

‘It is proper’, says Master Tilman. ‘It is what’s done: the condemned forgives his hangman loud and clear so that everyone can hear. You know that?’

Daniel Kehlmann, Tyll, translated by Ross Benjamin

It seems preposterous to ask for forgiveness from a person you have subjected to unimaginable pain to coerce a false confession, on the basis of which you are about to end his life. As a personal favour for his own peace of mind, the hangman’s request would not be very compelling. Instead, he presents it as an unavoidable conclusion with the same flavour and force as the idea that a hangman’s son must become a hangman. The condemned has to forgive Master Tilman, because it is what’s done.

This passage turns out to be an excellent illustration of the analysis of social judgements – i.e., judgements connected to a social norm – defended by Brennan, Eriksson, Goodin, and Southwood in Explaining Norms. In chapter four, Brennan et al. develop a view on what distinguishes moral judgements from social judgements. Since they understand norms to be constituted by normative judgements, the difference between moral and social judgements directly concerns the difference between moral and social norms. I will limit my discussion to the view about judgements.

Master Tilman judges that the condemned should forgive the hangman. What type of normative judgement is this? If we look at what this judgement is about, we seem to be in moral territory. Forgiveness, especially in response to extreme harm, is normally a moral matter. Furthermore, in this case, the interests involved could hardly be more serious: while the condemned faces death, his actions determine (according to the relevant religious beliefs) whether the executioner faces eternal damnation. However, if this is a moral issue, then why does the hangman put such emphasis on forgiveness being the normal practice?

Focusing on the motivation for making the normative claim instead suggests that the normative judgement is prudential. You have to forgive me – for me to get the outcome that is in my best interest. This thought is undoubtedly behind Master Tilman’s insistence that forgiving is the right course of action. Eventually, he even drops the part of the claim that is not about his own fate: “I don’t care if you forgive the judges. That’s not my concern. You can handle that as you please.” Still, what he expresses is not a prudential judgement; with his concern for his own interest in the background, he conveys a different type of normative judgement, one he expects the condemned to agree with. The evil warlock may not care about his hangman’s fate, but he will surely be moved by what is proper.

Brennan et al. argue that the grounds of a normative judgement are crucial for which type of judgement it is. The difference between moral and social judgements lies not in the form or substance of the normative principles involved, but in the grounds of the judgement – that is, “the considerations that justify, in one’s mind, the normative principle that one accepts” (p. 68). The next part of the view is that social judgements, in contrast to moral judgements, have presumed social practices as at least part of their grounds:

it somehow appears to one that a special kind of behavioural regularity that one takes to exist within one’s particular group or community constitutes some non-derivative aspect of the justification for acting in accordance with a normative principle to which the practice corresponds (and perhaps also for disapproving of those who fail to act in accordance with the principle, encouraging others to comply, and so on).

Brennan, Eriksson, Goodin & Southwood, Explaining Norms, p. 69

The hangman’s judgement squarely fits this description. The normative principle involved is that the condemned ought to forgive their executioner. The consideration that justifies this principle, in Master Tilman’s mind, is that there is a social practice of forgiving the executioner in their society. It is thought to be justified to act in accordance with this principle – and to disapprove of someone who fails to act in accordance with it – just because forgiving is what’s done. On the Grounds View of Brennan et al., this makes this normative judgement a social one.

I take this to be the right classification. The hangman’s appeal to what is proper and normal is significant. Although the demanded action falls into serious moral territory and there is a strong prudential motive involved, the normative principle is (thought to be) justified by what people normally do, which makes this a judgement connected to a social norm.

There is still something odd, or even inappropriate, about appealing to what’s done for an issue with such high stakes. Brennan et al. suggest that we tend to recognise moral limits to what social practices can justify: conduct that affects our core interests can only be justified by claims about core interests, not by an appeal to social practices (pp. 86-7). We can therefore maintain that the hangman’s judgement relates to a social norm, not a moral one, while criticising it as out of place. Moreover, it is plausible that this norm may simply be ignored. While the hangman is making his demands, the to-be-hanged rightly shows very little interest in what is expected of him, instead focusing all his attention on devouring his last meal.